The Cost of Speed: A Post-Mortem of the 2020 Arizona Election Projection

In the high-stakes theater of modern American election coverage, the mantra for news networks has long been “faster is better.” However, a recent report issued by the Associated Press (AP) and the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) at the University of Chicago, titled Assessing APVoteCast2020, has cast a long shadow over the efficacy and reliability of the data models used to make those rapid-fire projections.

The report inadvertently confirms what many media critics suspected in the wake of the 2020 election: the AP’s decision to call Arizona for Joe Biden on Election Night was a precarious gamble supported by flawed data. While the eventual outcome of the race proved correct, the methodology used to justify the early call remains a case study in the perils of prioritizing speed over statistical rigor.

The Anatomy of an Early Call

On the night of November 3, 2020, the political world was fixated on Arizona. As results began to trickle in, Fox News—relying on its proprietary data model, AP VoteCast—declared Joe Biden the winner of the Grand Canyon State. The Associated Press followed suit three hours later. At the time of the Fox News call, Biden led by a commanding nine percentage points; by the time the AP issued its own call, that lead had narrowed to five points.

The core of the issue lies in the reliance on AP VoteCast, a massive polling project that surveys voters both before and during Election Day. Unlike traditional exit polls, which track voters as they leave polling stations, VoteCast is designed to provide a comprehensive forecast to assist networks in calling races early. In the 2020 Arizona contest, the VoteCast model projected a comfortable 6.2-point lead for Joe Biden. In reality, Biden’s margin of victory was a razor-thin 0.3 percentage points—a difference of fewer than 10,500 votes out of nearly 3.4 million cast.

The data reveals that the projection was made long before the math was settled. Had the VoteCast model accurately reflected the actual slim margin, the AP and Fox News almost certainly would have held back. The decision was not based on a definitive vote count, but on a statistical prediction that proved to be significantly detached from the final reality.

A Chronology of Miscalculation

The events of November 3, 2020, unfolded with a speed that masked significant underlying errors.

• Pre-Election: AP VoteCast surveys indicated a “comfortable” lead for Joe Biden in Arizona, creating a baseline expectation of a decisive victory for the Democratic candidate.
• Election Night (Early Evening): Fox News’s decision desk, led by Arnon Mishkin, observed early returns. By 11:00 PM, they estimated that 80% of the vote had been counted.
• The Call (11:20 PM EST): Fox News projects Arizona for Joe Biden. Mishkin justifies the call by stating that Donald Trump would need to capture 60% of the remaining outstanding votes to overtake Biden—a scenario he deemed mathematically impossible based on his team’s analysis that Trump would struggle to break 46% of the remaining vote.
• The AP Follow-up (approx. 2:50 AM EST): Following a similar analysis of the VoteCast model and the state’s vote count, the Associated Press officially calls Arizona for Biden.
• The Following Days: As the remaining ballots were tabulated, the gap between Biden and Trump did not widen as projected. Instead, the lead began to shrink dramatically. While Biden ultimately won the state, the margin was a mere 0.3 percentage points, compared to the 6.2-point lead predicted by the poll.
• The Aftermath: By November 12, nine days after the election, other major news organizations finally felt confident enough to call the state for Biden, waiting until virtually every vote had been accounted for.

Supporting Data: When Models Fail

The Assessing APVoteCast2020 report is notable for what it documents regarding the failures of the predictive model. The discrepancy between the predicted 6.2% lead and the actual 0.3% victory is massive in the context of polling. Furthermore, the assumptions regarding the “outstanding vote” were deeply flawed.

Mishkin’s justification relied on the belief that the remaining pool of ballots would follow a certain distribution. However, the ballots that arrived later in the week tilted heavily toward the Republican candidate, nearly erasing the lead that prompted the premature call.

The systemic failure extended beyond the presidential race. Using the same VoteCast data, Fox News projected that Democrats would not only maintain control of the U.S. House of Representatives but would expand their majority by at least five seats. The reality was a stark departure: Democrats retained control, but lost a net of 11 seats. This serves as a potent reminder that the VoteCast model was not merely "off" in one instance; it suffered from a fundamental misalignment with the electorate’s actual behavior in 2020.

Official Responses and the Culture of Doubling Down

In the face of these discrepancies, the leadership at the AP has largely doubled down on their decision-making process. David Scott, the AP’s political editor, maintained in interviews with NPR that even with the benefit of hindsight, he would not change the call.

Sally Buzbee, who served as executive editor of the AP at the time of the election and has since moved to the Washington Post, stated that the election results "generally matched the outcome that was estimated by AP VoteCast." This defense has been widely criticized by data analysts and media observers as misleading. To suggest that a 0.3% margin is a "match" for a 6.2% projection is to ignore the statistical significance of the gap.

The refusal to acknowledge the error is particularly troubling to critics who argue that transparency is the bedrock of journalistic integrity. By insisting the call was "correct" because the winner was identified, the AP ignores the fact that the process used to arrive at that conclusion was demonstrably faulty. They were, in the view of many, simply lucky that the bad data did not lead to a wrong outcome.

Implications for the Future of Election Coverage

The primary driver behind the push for faster calls is the intense competition between media organizations. There is a persistent, albeit misguided, belief that viewers flock to the network that reports the result first. This "rush to judgment" has been a feature of American media since the infamous 2000 Florida debacle, where Fox News and other networks projected George W. Bush as the winner only to retract it hours later.

The 2020 Arizona call highlights the dangers of replacing traditional, cautious journalism with reliance on proprietary, black-box algorithms. As Nate Silver of FiveThirtyEight noted shortly after the election, there is little to be gained by calling a race before the votes are in. The public interest is not served by a "first" designation; it is served by an accurate one.

The Erosion of Public Trust

When major news organizations prioritize being first, they risk their reputation on the accuracy of models that are clearly prone to significant variance. The "something is amiss" sentiment regarding the VoteCast model is not just a technical critique; it is a warning about the fragility of public confidence in the media.

If the public perceives that news organizations are guessing—even educated guessing—based on flawed data, it provides fuel for those who seek to delegitimize the entire electoral process. By acting with undue haste, these organizations provide an opening for conspiracy theories and deep-seated skepticism that could have been avoided had they exercised the patience shown by their peers.

Conclusion

The 2020 Arizona projection serves as a sobering lesson for the media landscape. In the pursuit of being first, the Associated Press and Fox News sacrificed the cautious, incremental approach that historically defined responsible election reporting. While the final result of the Arizona election was eventually confirmed as a Biden victory, the path to that call was paved with bad data and premature confidence.

Moving forward, the industry must decide whether the prestige of being "first" is worth the risk of being wrong. As the Assessing APVoteCast2020 report makes clear, the tools currently in use are not infallible. Until these models can demonstrate a higher level of accuracy and the organizations that use them can demonstrate a greater willingness to admit fault, the "rush to judgment" will continue to be a significant liability for the fourth estate. Prudence, not speed, should be the primary benchmark for the next election cycle.